

# An Introduction to Contemporary Japanese Politics (3)

The Policy-making Process and The Pressure Groups

(This article was written in May 1993)

Hiroshi Nakamura

## (1) The Policy-making Process

### CONTENTS

- 1 Outline
- 2 Diet
- 3 Cabinet
- 4 Bureaucrats
- 5 The Policy-making Process
- 6 Comparative Analysis with Britain and the U.S.A.
- 7 Theoretical Analysis
- 8 Further Readings

## 1 *Outline*

### (1) *In Principle*

*The Diet : the Highest Organ of State Power and the Sole Law Making Body*

The Japanese Constitution stipulates that the Diet is the highest organ of the state and the sole law making body. Although Japanese political institutions operate on the basis of the separation of powers, constitutional law vests supremacy in the legislative body. Law can be enacted only by the Diet. No other organs possess the right to make rules which are superior to the law.

The cabinet must enforce the laws legislated by the Diet. It does not have the right to steer the administration in a direction which is against the law. The cabinet's position as the executor of laws and budgets is stipulated in the Constitution.

The Prime Minister is elected by the Diet. He must be a Diet member. He can select his ministry. The majority of ministers should have seats in one of the two Houses. The constitutional core of the Japanese political institution is the parliamentary cabinet system.

*The Diet : the Representatives of the Nation*

The Japanese Diet is composed of two Houses : the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. The members of both Houses are representatives of the whole nation, and act as independent legislators, at least in principle.

According to the Constitution delegates despatched from particular constituencies and agents of specific organizations can not be Diet members. The Constitution seems to have given the Diet supreme power on the assumption that parliamentarians are endowed with absolute independence, talent and wisdom.

It may be confidently said that the Constitution did not anticipate the political reality : the existence of powerful and disciplined parties as well as a tightly organized bureaucracy.

(2) *In Practice*

*Who Presents Bills? The Cabinet*

The right to present bills is rested in both the Diet itself and the cabinet. However the Diet members are expected to act as the principal proponents of bills, from the constitutional standpoint at least.

In actual practice most bills are proposed by the cabinet. Most laws are enacted as a result of government bills. Private members' bills are very few.

The Diet could be viewed as an organ which exists simply to provide approval for government bills. This is certainly the case when the government party enjoys a majority in both Houses.

It is a matter of course that cabinet ministers are concurrently leaders of the government party. The majority of parliamentarians belonging to the government party are simple back benchers.

*Who Draft Bills? The Bureaucrats*

All government bills are submitted to cabinet meetings and must win cabinet approval. However time restrictions prevent cabinet ministers from debating bills sufficiently, let alone drafting them.

It is bureaucrats or senior civil servants who draft most government bills. In practice, they may be the true legislators.

*Whose Representatives are the Diet Members?*

Japanese parliamentarians conform to party discipline. The members of some parties even submit letters of resignation en masse to indicate their strong protest over a particular issue.

Diet members make speeches not to declare their political views as independent parliamentarians, but to air the views of their parties.

The result of voting can be easily forecast. The reason is that all parliamentarians must cast their ballots according to the decision of their parties' headquarters. Cross-voting seldom takes place in the Japanese Diet. This is in striking contrast to the U.S. congressional model.

*The Real Situation Concerning Debate in the Diet*

It is not necessarily true that heated and serious debate takes place in the Diet. Parliamentarians do not always possess sufficient specialist knowledge. Although they are professionals at electioneering, some of them are complete amateurs in terms of sophisticated administration.

Parliamentary debate has not been productive for many years as a consequence of the LDP's majority in both Houses. The resistance shown by

the opposition parties is often simply opposition for the opposition's sake and is aimed at the next general election.

### (3) *Changes in Recent Years*

#### *Decline in the Power of the Bureaucrats*

The LDP, the business community and the bureaucrats were previously known as three power holders of equal strength. In recent years, however, the influence of bureaucrats seems to have declined. It is said that the LDP has gradually established its dominance over the bureaucrats.

LDP government is almost forty years old. The Liberal Democrats have become rather proficient in administrative and legislative procedures. Meanwhile the social status of bureaucrats continues to decline.

The "Meiji" Constitution and the prewar social structure gave bureaucrats great prestige. The new constitution and the changing social structure seems to have contributed to their decline. We must, however, note that this decline has not engendered any expansion of parliamentary democracy.

#### *The New Situation Since the Attainment of a Dominant Position by the Opposition Parties*

The 1989 House of Councillors' general election established the first opposition majority in the Upper House since the foundation of the LDP in 1955. The LDP government is now unable to enact any bills, with the exception of budgetary bills, without the cooperation of opposition parties.

The process of enacting the Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill demonstrated the unstable and complicated partial coalition which exists between the LDP and Kōmeitō, and the LDP and the DSP. The opposition majority makes negotiations between the LDP and other parties more important than negotiations between the Liberal Democrats and bureaucrats.

The so-called ox walk delaying tactic is famous as the last resort of op-

position parties. The SDPJ and the JCP resorted to this tactic on the occasion of the Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill vote in 1992.

## 2 *Diet*

### (1) *The Constitution of the Diet*

#### *A Bicameral System*

The Japanese Diet consists of two chambers: the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Many countries possess bicameral systems. In Britain's case the history of the British parliament fully explains its bicameral system. The federal state system of the U. S., on the other hand, provides us with the reason for the emergence of the U. S. two chamber system.

In prewar Japan, the Diet consisted of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. Although Japan is not a federal state, its Diet is therefore composed of two chambers.

#### *The House of Representatives*

The Japanese Lower House is called the House of Representatives. The number of seats in this House is fixed at 511, as of March 1993. This is often considered to be too many. It may therefore be reduced in the near future.

The tenure of Lower House members is four years. However this four year limit is rarely reached as parliament is almost inevitably dissolved early.

#### *The House of Councillors*

The members of the Upper House are also elected directly by the people. They represent the whole nation, as do Lower House members.

The fixed number of Upper House seats is 252. The term of office is six years. This House is never dissolved, as the cabinet was not given dissolution rights by the Constitution.

(2) *Law Making Procedure*

*The Approval of Both Houses*

A bill is enacted when it has passed through both Houses, at least as a general principle. In other words, making law calls in principle for the approval of both Houses.

A bill can be presented first to either of the two Houses. The bill will be sent to the other House following the approval of the first. Laws are promulgated by the Emperor following the approval of both Houses. The promulgation of the Emperor, however, is only a matter of form.

*Standing Committees and Special Committees*

Substantial debate in the Diet, if we can call it that, is carried out primarily by the committees of both Houses. Each House possesses its own committees.

There are two types of committees. One is a standing committee. The other is an ad hoc or special committee. Standing committees are active on a permanent basis and are based in individual government departments. For instance, the largest and most influential standing committee, the budgetary committee is based in the Finance Ministry.

Ad hoc committees are set up to discuss special issues. The Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill was debated by one of these committees, the United Nations Peacekeeping Cooperation Special Committee. Discussion of political corruption is often carried out by such special committees set up on a temporary basis. Although graft scandals are a chronic disease, no relevant standing committee has been established to examine them.

*Plenary Sessions*

Bills are debated in plenary sessions following the committee vote, regardless of whether the Bill was approved or disapproved at the committee level. The quorum for plenary sessions is one third or more of both Houses.

Plenary sessions discuss bills as a matter of form and as a prelude to voting. It goes without saying that a simple majority is required for approval of the respective House, except for specific cases.

### (3) *The Kinds of Sessions*

#### *Ordinary Sessions*

Japanese Diet sessions are categorized legally into three types. One is the ordinary session. It must be summoned every January in accordance with the Constitution. The term of this ordinary session is determined by law to be one hundred and fifty days. It can be extended by a resolution of the Diet, however. The most important task of this session is to draft the budget for the next financial year.

#### *Extraordinary Sessions*

The cabinet has the right to summon the Diet whenever the cabinet considers that the Diet should be convened. Diet members themselves also possess the right to force the cabinet to summon the Diet.

Sessions convened according to the discretion of cabinet, or as a consequence of parliamentary demand, are called extraordinary sessions.

Those sessions which follow end of term Lower House elections and all Upper House elections are also called extraordinary sessions. The law stipulates that these sessions must be summoned without fail.

#### *Special Ordinary Sessions*

Sessions following elections which are called on account of the Lower House dissolution are known, in the original Japanese, as something other than 'extraordinary sessions'. These two different sessions, neither of which are ordinary sessions, are usually known by the same English name: extraordinary session. If pressed, we may term the latter a 'special extraordinary session'. The terms of these extraordinary sessions are not fixed. They can be extended by a resolution of the Diet.

(4) *The Supremacy of the House of Representatives  
In Making Law*

The Houses do not have equal power, just as in the bicameral systems of many other countries. Parliaments are often stalled when both Houses possess equal power.

The Lower House can enact bills without the approval of the Upper House. When the Upper House rejects a bill which has been passed by the Lower House, a majority of two-thirds or more in the lower House is required in subsequent lower House voting. Such a majority is regarded as an indication of consent by the Diet as a whole. Japanese Constitutional Law stipulates the following :

*In Designating the Prime Minister :*

Each House designates its own prime ministerial candidate on the basis of an election. If both Houses designate the same person, he or she is designated by the Diet and appointed by the Emperor. The Emperor is the symbol of national integration and possesses no substantial political power. His appointments are conducted as a matter of form, as required by the constitution.

Under the LDP's many years of dominance, both Houses designated consecutive LDP Presidents until the 1989 Upper House general election.

If each House designates a different person or the Upper House does not designate any person within ten days following the Lower House designation, the candidate who is designated by the Lower House is appointed to the prime ministership.

In the extraordinary session following the 1989 Upper House election, the Lower House designated "Toshiki Kaifu", the then LDP President. However, the Upper House designated "Takako Doi", the then Chairperson of the SDPJ. In accordance with the Constitution, Kaifu was designated by the Diet and inaugurated as Premier.

*Concerning the Budget*

The Lower House possesses the right of prior deliberation of budgetary bills. If the Upper House does not approve bills passed by the Lower House, or if the Upper House does not vote within thirty days after Lower House approval, then the budget is enacted on the approval of the Lower House only.

Even before the 1989 general election, budgets were sometimes approved by the Diet on the basis of this thirty day limit on Upper House deliberation.

*Concerning the Ratification of Treaties*

Constitutional law stipulates the same conditions for the ratification of treaties as it does for the approval of budgets. The Upper House must provide its consent for treaties passed by the Lower House within thirty days, or the consent of the Lower House becomes the basis for ratification by the Diet.

Although the Lower House does not possess the right of prior deliberation, the government has always called for the prior approval of the Lower House. The government can therefore obtain ratification by the Diet on the basis of a Lower House majority vote. The present U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was ratified in this way, namely without the approval of the Upper House.

*Exceptions*

With regard to the revision of the Constitution, both Houses have been given equal power. A proposal to revise the Constitution requires a majority of two thirds or more in both Houses.

It can safely be said that the *raison d'être* of the Upper House has been to prevent revisions to the Constitution. This has been possible because the opposition parties which oppose such revisions have held over one third of the seats for many years prior to the 1989 Upper House general election.

A revision of the Constitution requires a proposal by the Diet and then a referendum of all the electors.

### 3 *Cabinet*

#### (1) *The Role of the Cabinet in Principle*

##### *The Separation of Powers*

In principle the Diet is the highest organ of state power and the sole law making body. On the other hand, the cabinet has been bestowed with administrative power.

The Diet or more strictly speaking, the Lower House, possesses the right to initiate a no-confidence vote in the cabinet. The cabinet possesses the right to dissolve the Lower House. Constitutional law ensures that these two bodies remain in equilibrium, at least in principle.

The legislative body is vested with the right to impeach the judiciary. On the other hand, the judiciary is vested with the right to nullify unconstitutional law. The cabinet is vested with the right to appoint judges to the supreme court. On the other hand, the judiciary is vested with the right to pass judgement on the illegality and inappropriateness of the administration.

Three bodies therefore maintain their balance on the basis of constitutional law. They are independent of each other, at least in principle.

#### (2) *the Power of the Cabinet*

##### *The Fusion of Two Powers*

The government party, namely the party which occupies the majority of seats in the Lower House, forms the cabinet. The government party obtains not only legislative power but also administrative power under the parliamentary cabinet system.

Although parties are the main actors in the present political scene, constitutional institutions are not composed on the basis of real world party

politics. Viewed from the perspective of party politics, legislative power and administrative power are confused in the government party.

#### *Party Cabinet*

From the constitutional point of view, the Japanese cabinet system is a typical parliamentary cabinet system. However, from the point of view of practical party politics, it is also a typical party cabinet system.

The prime minister is the president of the ruling party while the other ministers are leaders of that party. The cabinet holds a dominant position over the Diet, which consists of the rank and file of the government and all opposition party members.

### (3) *the Dictatorship of the Cabinet*

#### *In General*

It is often said that the dictatorship of cabinet ensures that the sovereignty of parliament is a dead letter. This dictatorship seems to prevail in many parliamentary and party cabinet systems.

It is sometimes said that the dictatorship of the prime minister weakens the power of cabinet meetings and destroys the cabinet principle of collective responsibility.

#### *In the Case of Japan*

In Japan, political manoeuvring often seems to make the contention that the Diet is the highest organ of state true in name only. However the primacy of cabinet is not necessarily observed in Japanese politics. Complete authority exercised by the prime minister is seldom practiced.

The reason for this is LDP factional politics. The prime minister is certainly the president of the party. Nevertheless he (or she) is not necessarily the most powerful politician. The Prime Minister is often not the top leader of the largest faction and, in some cases, is not even the top leader of any faction. For example, former premier Kaifu was not the head of his faction.

Moreover, the faction to which he belonged was the weakest of the then five major factions.

Meanwhile, other ministers are also not necessarily influential leaders of their factions. In such a situation, the true party leaders, in other words, the bosses of the factions, work behind the scenes to manipulate the cabinet, including the prime minister, like puppets.

(4) *the Formation of Cabinet*

*The Formation of Cabinets According to the Factional Balance*

The prime minister is bestowed with the right to select ministers. However, this right exists only in principle. It is LDP tradition that the twenty ministerial posts and three senior party posts (the Secretary General, Chairpersons of the Executive Committee and the Policy Research Council) are allocated to individual factions according to their share of LDP Diet members. For example, when one hundred members of the four hundred LDP parliamentarians belong to one faction, one fourth of these twenty three top posts, either five or six positions, are allotted to this faction.

The Prime Minister selects ministers and the top party leaders on the basis of recommendations by individual faction heads. Traditionally, the leaders of individual factions possess a decisive voice in the allocation of posts to their own factional members. For this reason, Japanese cabinet can be said to be factionally-balanced.

*Cabinets and the power of factions*

After the long premiership of Satō from 1964 to 1972, the average tenure of prime ministers during the 1970's and 1980's was about two years. The only exception to this was Nakasone's five year term.

One of the fundamental reasons for this brevity is the LDP's factional base. The premiership, or the LDP presidency, must be rotated between the factions. Although there is no written rule, the top leadership has changed

after one term, as a result of factional competition. As I mentioned earlier, the term of the LDP's presidency is stipulated as two years.

(5) *Limits on the Power of the Cabinet*

*Factional Dynamics*

The power of prime ministers, namely LDP presidents, has been conditioned to date by factional dynamics. Even premiers who, during their term in office, led in dictatorial style the largest LDP faction at the time, often met persistent resistance from anti-main stream factions. Those prime ministers who belonged to small factions have often been criticized in the past as puppets controlled by the largest faction in the ruling party. In these cases the bosses of the largest faction have gained notoriety behind the scenes rulers.

*The Power of Bureaucrats*

Prime ministers or ministers or cabinets as a whole cannot do their work without the cooperation of bureaucrats. Politicians are too busy to exercise all the power that they legally have.

The average tenure of ministers is much briefer than that of prime ministers. Cabinets are reformed following general elections of the Lower House and are often reshuffled on other occasions. Ministerial posts must be given to many politicians who seek promotion.

As a natural outcome of their short terms, many ministers can not fulfill their duties without the help of bureaucrats.

*The Power of Interest Groups*

It need not be said that the power of cabinets is often restricted in substance by the resistance or lobbying of interest groups. The media also often control the activities of cabinets. Sometimes public opinion affects cabinet decision making.

#### 4 *Bureaucrats*

##### (1) *Their Promotion*

###### *Recruitment, the Examinations*

The system of recruitment and promotion of civil servants has functioned on the basis of a merit system since the “Meiji” Restoration. Civil servants are employed upon the basis of their examination results. More examinations are carried out at each level of service. Very few applicants can be promoted to senior administrative posts.

###### *First Jobs*

From the start, candidates for bureaucratic positions often engage in special tasks, particularly in the Finance Ministry. In this way, they come into contact with politicians. That is, they gain direct access to Diet members in order to obtain useful information, for example, what they intend to interpellate in the current or next session. Future bureaucrats are trained as an elite in the political world from early in their career.

###### *High Speed Promotion*

Candidates for high civil servant positions rise in rank extremely fast. ‘Special shuttle services’ between head quarters of individual departments in Tōkyō and local branches or local governments realize their speedy promotion. Future senior officers are often appointed to high ranking posts in these local bodies when still in their thirties.

##### (2) *Social Background*

###### *Educational Career*

In principle, every citizen within the set age limit is eligible to take the examination for the high class civil service track. However, in actual fact, almost all successful candidates are students of universities. Tōkyō University, and especially its Law Department has gained the largest share of these positions in many years.

Most senior officers in governmental departments are therefore alumni of Tōkyō University's Law Department. The traditional solidarity of bureaucrats is maintained by this human relationship network. This academic clique in official circles is the most powerful school clique in Japan.

*Fathers' Social Status*

Many parents of today's bureaucrats belong to the upper class or at least the middle class. This was also the case during the prewar years.

Many fathers of incumbent bureaucrats are university graduates. And their fathers also held managerial or administrative posts.

These days many bureaucrats' spouses are the daughters of managers of large enterprises or other members of the social elite. Daughters of politicians also often marry hopeful young bureaucrats.

Senior civil servants are never servants for ordinary citizens. They are a part of the social elite. Many of them were born into the elite.

In recent years, however, the social status of bureaucrats has gradually declined. This traditional elite track through official circles may not interest great numbers of brilliant students in the future.

(3) *Power*

*Making Drafts or Budgetary Bills*

Drafts of bills are usually drawn up by young bureaucrats of the relevant government department. It is well known that they often draft bills to sustain and enlarge the vested interests of their own departments. Civil servants of the national government move mainly inside the ministries or agencies to which they were first assigned. Territorial disputes or bureaucratic sectionalism is a consequence of the traditional pursuit of narrow interests.

Bureaucrats of the Finance Ministry are the most prestigious and power-

ful. They control other departments through their compilation of the budget.

*Administrations, Influence on Companies and Local Governments*

There are numerous ways in which bureaucrats sometimes promote and at other times intervene in the economic activities of private companies. Some of this administrative interference seems to be aimed at the private interests of the bureaucrats.

Many senior posts in local governments, especially prefectural or large city governments, are occupied by young bureaucrats from the central government. For example, many section chiefs are young bureaucrats still in their twenties.

*Reply in the Diet*

It is bureaucrats who prepare replies in the Diet for their ministers. In actual fact bureaucrats themselves often reply during the formal deliberations of parliament.

Ministers can easily lose face without the support of experienced bureaucrats, who even gather expected questions in advance.

(4) *After Retirement*

*Into the Political World*

The most ambitious bureaucrats gain ground in the political world. They stand as candidates in national or gubernatorial elections. Most of them are authorized or supported by the LDP. Some of them are sons or sons in law of conservative politicians.

Many consecutive prime ministers are ex-bureaucrats, for example: Shigeru Yoshida, Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Sato, Takeo Fukuda, Masayoshi Ohira and Kiich Miyazawa. In local politics almost half of the governors are ex-bureaucrats.

In recent years, however, the conservative political community has not

provided privileged treatment for ex-bureaucrats to the extent that it did in former days. Ex-bureaucrat parliamentarians who do not achieve sufficient electoral success are seldom rewarded these days with ministerial posts. If they aspire to ministerial posts, they must leave their government offices when in their thirties or at the latest, their early forties. It is therefore difficult for them to enter the political world upon the basis of brilliant careers as outstanding bureaucrats.

*“Amakudari”*

As stated above, many bureaucrats retire voluntarily, according to their tradition, and find their second job in private companies. For many years, however, bureaucrats have been making an effort to stand on their own feet following their retirement.

*Public Corporation*

Individual government departments control in total several hundred public corporations. These public corporations are semi-private enterprises and are to some extent independent of the government. Their work needless to say, is for the benefit of the whole people, at least in principle.

In actual fact, however, these public corporations are said often to be established for the benefit of the bureaucrats concerned. Many of their directors are recruited from government offices. It goes without saying that extraordinarily high salaries and retirement allowances are provided in line with the laws drafted by the bureaucrats themselves. These public corporations therefore function well for the honorable self-reliance of ex-bureaucrats.

## 5 *The Policy-making Process*

### (1) *Who Makes the Original Drafts?*

*Bureaucrats Make Them* : As mentioned above, bills are usually first drafted by junior bureaucrats in their thirties. Bureaucracy-led decision making is

the norm in Japan. Furthermore, decision making is led by a ministry or agency which possesses direct jurisdiction over the matter. Policies are therefore often developed from the narrow viewpoint of the particular department concerned.

(2) *The Bottom up system and inter ministry coordination as spadework*

*Ringi*: Ministers, administrative vice ministers or even bureau chiefs are seldom the original proposers of specific policies or bills. Decision making starts from the bottom, usually at the level of young section sub-chiefs. This type of sub-chief in the administrative class contrasts remarkably with the section sub-chiefs who belong to the clerical class and are usually in their fifties.

Original bills drafted by the youngest bureaucrats are approved by section chiefs with only slight amendments. Approval is then sought from the bureau chiefs and administrative vice ministers.

Decision making in individual ministries or agencies proceeds from the bottom to the top and is based on unanimous consensus. This system of decision making is often called the “Ringi” system in Japanese. There is no suitable English translation of this word.

*“Nemawashi”*

This process of bottom up decision making based on unanimous consent demands much spadework inside individual government departments and among many of the departments concerned. In this context, spadework refers to the informal coordination that takes place before formal approval is sought.

Such informal negotiation is detectable in almost all spheres of Japanese life. It is most often the case that all parties concerned with a decision have already declared at least tacit agreement before the final and formal decision is made. For example, the permanent vice ministerial meeting is a

simple ceremony or formal procedure to ratify decisions already reached.

*Groupism : The Japanese Approach to Decision Making*

Decisions are seldom made by individual politicians or senior bureaucrats. Many persons are involved in the process and are drawn from government departments, political parties (including opposition parties) and interest groups. It is a system of unfocused responsibility but it is effective. No person takes overall responsibility for a particular outcome. On the other hand, however, all participants are forced in some way to cooperate in the execution of decisions.

(3) *'Lobbying' by Parties*

*The LDP, the Policy Research Council*

The ruling LDP is formally a policy maker. In actual fact however, the Liberal Democrats, either as individual politicians or as a body, often lobby government departments. The LDP seldom takes the initiative in making specific policies.

Government bills or budgetary bills are compiled on the basis of negotiations between government departments and the LDP, or to be specific, individual departments of the Policy Research Council. Government policies are the product of collaboration between bureaucrats and the Liberal Democrats.

It is a natural outcome of the party cabinet system that a parliament dominated by the government party seldom scrutinizes or checks the government.

*Opposition Parties*

Opposition party parliamentarians also lobby government offices, but less effectively. The neutral standpoint of bureaucrats is mere window dressing. With the exception of the JCP, however, opposition party politicians sometimes do acquire fruit through their lobbying. Their con-

stituencies or interest groups often request that they promote particular interests through their contact with bureaucrats.

#### *Negotiation Between the Government Party and the Opposition Parties*

Meetings are held to negotiate the contents of bills or procedures of deliberation in the Diet. In addition to public negotiations, secret talks between the bosses of the LDP and the opposition parties are also often carried out.

It is often said that LDP politicians in charge of steering deliberations in the Diet and their counterparts in the opposition parties (apart from the JCP) often hold secret meetings at night. Human relationships across party lines are fabricated behind the scenes. The activities of these “Diet affairs policy tribes” are therefore a kind of behind the scenes manoeuvring.

#### (4) *Ceremonial Debate in the Diet*

Long-established observations indicate that complicated deliberations in the Diet are often the product of a tacit understanding reached behind the scenes. In this sense, parliamentary discussion is said to be a ceremony performed for public consumption.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that the LDP can do anything it wants. On the contrary, the LDP is driven by necessity to reach such understandings through spadework with the opposition parties.

An overwhelming majority in both houses would allow the ruling party to enact all its bills without the need for negotiation. However its majorities have long been narrow. When it became a minority party in the upper house following the 1989 election, it had no choice but to negotiate with some of the opposition parties.

#### *Resistance of the Opposition Parties*

Even with a majority in both houses the government party is not necessarily able to pass all its bills due to restrictions caused by legal procedures

and the time limit for each session. Various clauses of the Diet Law combined with parliamentary customs make it possible for the opposition parties to resist.

The LDP would be unable to do such spadework, however, if all opposition parties were true opposition forces resisting the LDP. In actual fact, it is not at all difficult for the LDP to maintain contact and to negotiate with some of the opposition parties. In this way the LDP has gained many advantages while always offering something to the opposition parties so that they do not lose face. This could take the form of minor amendments or the opportunity for them to demonstrate 'resolute opposition' in the eyes of the voting public.

## 6 *Comparative Analysis with Britain and the U. S. A.*

### (1) *Similarities and Differences between Japan and Britain*

#### *Fundamental Similarities*

The parliamentary cabinet system forms the common base for the decision making systems of both countries. It goes without saying that the British system is a representative parliamentary cabinet system and has the longest history.

However, the British cabinet was presided over by the king or queen long before the premiership of Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745).

In those days, the cabinet was not a party cabinet and was not based on collective responsibility. Individual ministers assisted and obeyed the king or queen.

In prewar Japan, individual ministers (including the prime minister) assisted and obeyed the emperor. A party cabinet emerged during the "Taishō" era. In principle, the prewar cabinet was responsible not to the Diet but to the emperor.

Both in Japan and Britain, cabinet occupies the most pivotal position in

the decision making process. The prime ministers, needless to say, are the leading figures in this process. The Japanese emperor is a symbol. Unlike the British crown, the emperor is not a constitutional monarch with formal sovereignty.

Public advisory bodies are significant actors in both countries. They are the main routes through which interest groups can exert influence upon their governments.

### *Differences*

The Japanese prime minister is designated by the Diet. Appointment by the emperor is only a nominal procedure. Meanwhile the British queen appoints the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons without the designation of parliament. Although restricted by constitutional custom, the queen possesses the right to choose the prime minister. This power might be exercised, for example, when no party wins a majority following a general election.

British senior civil servants do not enjoy as much influence as their Japanese counterparts. British senior civil servants are also employed according to their record in the administrative service examination. Promotion from the clerical class only takes place under exceptional circumstances. Both systems are built on the basis of the so-called merit system.

However, in former days the British civil service incorporated the so-called spoils system. Under this system, politicians enjoyed the power to appoint and dismiss senior civil servants. This makes a striking contrast with the fact that politicians attended bureaucrats in prewar Japan.

In Britain even senior civil servants are considered to be clerks who serve politicians. It is only in exceptional cases that former senior civil servants enter the political world.

It seems that the British cabinet and prime minister exercise more

decisive power than their counterparts in Japan. Margaret Thatcher, in particular, was often branded a dictator.

The fundamental reason for this difference in leadership styles seems to be party structure. The LDP is a factional coalition. However, we can not observe such powerful factions as those of the LDP in the British Conservative Party. British factions are only policy study meetings formed on the basis of different policy orientations.

In the case of the Labour Party, the prime minister's leadership seems to be conditioned by stronger intra-party factional politics than is the case with the Conservative Party.

## (2) *Similarities and Differences Between Japan and the U. S. A.*

### Fundamental Differences

The political institution in the U. S. is established on the principle of the separation of powers. Fundamentally, legislative power belongs to the Congress while administrative power belongs to the President.

There is a fundamental institutional difference between a parliamentary cabinet system and a presidential system. Furthermore, in recent years in the U. S., this separation of powers was an actual fact, due to the conflict between the Republican President and the Democrat dominated Congress.

It is only the parliamentarians who can present bills before the U. S. Congress. The President possesses the right to present only the budgetary bill.

As I mentioned earlier, in the case of Japan, only the parties enjoy the power to present so-called private members bills. However, in the case of the U. S. Congress, individual Congress Members are eligible to present bills and often do so. The initiative of parliamentarians as individuals can be observed in many law making processes.

The President, none the less, exercises the decisive influence publicly or behind the scenes. The presidential veto controls the law making process

in the Congress negatively but decisively. Meanwhile, as a matter of fact, the President can present bills with the cooperation of his followers in the Congress. It is difficult to judge which is more powerful in the policy-making process, the American President or the Prime Minister.

Radical differences exist between Japanese bureaucrats and American senior civil servants. The latter are appointed and dismissed by the President according to the so-called political appointee system. In other words, a spoils system is operative in the U. S. even today. However it can be said that this political appointee system secures democratic control of the bureaucracy.

Powerful interest groups can send their members or agents to government departments, thereby making use of this political appointee system. In this sense, powerful groups in the U. S. control the government more directly than their counterparts in Japan.

### (3) *The Japanese System*

#### *The Power of Bureaucrats*

One of the distinctive features of the decision making process in Japan is the striking influence of bureaucrats. This influence is not exercised by a handful of high ranking senior bureaucrats from the top, but by the whole range of officials, starting from the bottom. This contrasts markedly with the U. S. top down decision making system and with its lack of a powerful bureaucracy organized around a system of permanent employment.

#### *Long Term Government by the LDP*

The mighty Japanese bureaucracy maintains its closed and persistent connection with the LDP, despite its supposed political neutrality. One reason for this lack of neutrality is the position of bureaucrats as members of the social elite. The other reason is the LDP's long dominance in government. The neutrality of the bureaucracy is probably not possible without a

change of government.

Long term LDP government has produced a privileged relationship between the LDP and specific interest groups. Interest groups are either insiders with strong ties to the LDP government, or outsiders.

### *Factional Politics*

The decision making process involving mainly the ruling LDP, bureaucrats and insider pressure groups is made more complicated by factional politics within the LDP.

The competition among factions indicates some sort of plurality. However, factional struggles are something different from true and free competition among independent parties. All factions quarrel under the one umbrella of the permanent ruling party. Complicated human relationships cross factional borders.

## 7 *Theoretical Analysis*

### (1) *Merit System, Spoils System*

Generally speaking, the bureaucracy enjoys an influential voice in the policy making process under the civil service merit system which has a long term tradition in Japan. Under the Japanese system, bureaucrats themselves select their successors. In other words, they have established and continue to maintain an appointment and promotion system which uses criteria which they consider desirable and effective to judge the merit of civil servants.

Both in the prewar and postwar eras the Japanese bureaucracy has managed to escape from democratic control. Until a few decades ago it was often said that the actual decision makers were not ministers but permanent vice ministers.

In recent years, however, the LDP has exerted increasing control over the bureaucracy and makes the best use of it. Although the LDP's control

may appear to be government control over bureaucrats, it can hardly be considered to be popular control.

The purpose of LDP control or intervention does not seem to be to realize the interests of the whole nation, but rather to exploit its own interests, strictly speaking, the interests of individual Liberal Democrats, primarily in order to win elections.

It can be said that the Liberal Democrats and bureaucrats cohabit and share huge interests in the policy-making territory. Individual conservative politicians are often acting as lobbyists to preserve and enlarge the specific interests of individual ministries. On the other hand, senior civil servants act not as public servants, but rather as LDP servants to ensure its long term in government.

As mentioned above, in Britain the merit system was established in the latter half of the nineteenth century. One reason for the change of the appointment system was criticism of political patronage being a consequence of the spoils system. High ranking official posts were often abused, so to speak, as spoils of electoral victories by politicians. The other and more fundamental reason, however, was the emergence of positive government. This style of government demanded more efficient and stable administration. For this reason the British government introduced a civil service based on merit system.

This historical background and the regular change of governments seems to have promoted democratic control over government departments through the parliament and cabinet in Britain. However recent long term Conservative government may change the situation.

Popular control over bureaucracy seems to be difficult in Japan as no change of government takes place. Japanese people need an opposition party which possesses the ability to form a government as well as a powerful citizens movement which will produce an effective 'ombudsman' system.

*The Separation of Powers and the Confusion of Power*

According to a standard textbook view, the parliamentary cabinet system is a system designed to separate powers. Nevertheless in reality the Japanese parliamentary system functions as a system where powers are confused. Powerful LDP leaders seem to control not only the cabinet and parliament, but even judicial power through cabinet's appointment of judges to the supreme court. Real party politics seems to prevent a separation of powers. It is interesting to note, however, that according to Walter Bagehot, the separation of powers under the British parliamentary cabinet system became increasingly devoid of substance as party politics developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

In a sense, Japan is now either enjoying or is perplexed by a situation where there is a kind of separation of powers following the 1989 House of Councillors election. It seems that the LDP and opposition parties share power in the Lower and Upper Houses. The two chamber system may be said to promote the separation of powers, irrespective of the original intention of the creators of this institution.

In a sense, factional politics within the LDP appears to be a kind of separation of powers. The same can be said of bureaucratic sectionalism.

## Further Readings

*Charles F. Bingman*, Japanese Government Leadership and Management (Macmillan, 1989).

In his preface the author explains the theme of this work as follows "The Japanese have clearly been very successful in these purposes. (These purposes are to realize democracy and economic growth.) But the world seems slow in recognizing the achievements of the Japanese government in these

successes, and there is an unfortunate shortage of good assessment available in English about the Japanese government, how it functions, what it has sought to accomplish, and how well it has done. This book is an attempt to help fill that gap.”

This work presents an overview of Japanese public administration. It is useful as a concise text-book on Japanese government. The author assigns three chapters among a total of twelve to explaining local government.

As mentioned above, the author evaluates highly the efficiency of the government, in particular, its administrative guidance, quoting Chalmers Johnson.

“The power of administrative guidance greatly enhances the ability of Japanese economic officials to respond to new situations rapidly and with flexibility, and it gives them sufficient scope to take initiative.” (MITI and the Japanese Miracle, p. 273.)

*T. J. Pempel*, *Patterns of Japanese Policymaking : Experiences from Higher Education* (Westview Press, 1978).

In this work the author analyses Japanese higher education policy. In his conclusions the author argues as follows : “ ..... this study suggests that at least three clearly identifiable patterns can be found in postwar Japan : policymaking by camp conflict, policymaking by incrementalism, and pressure group policymaking”. (p. 185)

The author, however, describes the hegemonic pluralism common to all these cases in spite of the diversity mentioned. Though Japanese policymaking is pluralist, the power of the conservative camp is quite demonstrable. So the author argues that the Japanese pattern should be called hegemonic pluralism. The author, however, emphasizes that Japan still remains pluralistic.

*T. J. Pempel*, *Policy and Politics in Japan : Creative Conservatism* (Temple University Press, 1982).

The author reaches the following conclusion after comparing six cases (Economic Policy : State-Led Capitalism, Labour-Management Relations, Social Welfare, Higher Education, Environmental Protection : Turning Adversity to Advantage, and Administrative Reform).

One characteristic feature of Japanese public policies is their consistency compared with those in other advanced countries. The most important element is the fact that a conservative coalition and a powerful state apparatus have dominated policymaking for many years. One of the reasons for this long term dominance of conservatism is the relative weakness of the Japanese trade union movement. "But many of the policies followed by the conservatives have been creatively astute and at least tolerably popular, while many of the policy alternatives posed by the opposition parties have been unimaginative at best and on occasion almost totally devoid of insight and popular support." (p. 307) Elections and Diet deliberations have caused the LDP to adapt to the changes in society with flexibility. "The importance of elections and parliament on public policy in Japan should not be denied." (p. 310) The author concludes that it is creative conservatism that characterizes contemporary Japanese public policy.

*John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw* (ed.), *Committees in Legislatures : A Comparative Analysis* (Duke University Press, 1979).

This work is a comparative study on Committees in the parliaments of seven countries (the U. S. A, Italy, West Germany, Canada, Britain, India, and Japan). The article, 'Committees in the Japanese Diet' was contributed by Hans H. Barewald.

Barewald starts his explanation of Japanese committees as follows. "Japanese politics and political institutions present peculiar difficulties for students of comparative politics. Appearances tend to be deceptive ..... In the case of Japan, however, it is necessary to be particularly careful about matters concerning the relationship between form and substance." (p. 327)

In form or appearance, Japanese committees resemble the congressional committees in the U. S. A. However, the latter are the most important organ in the Legislature. The former are rather ornamental. For example, in principle, the formal 'House Steering Committee' controls the work of the House. In practice, however, an informal 'Diet Management Committee' controls it. This way of steering is called 'Kokutai Seiji'. It means policy making through "behind the scenes" negotiation among party leaders. Party discipline in Japan is far stricter than in the U. S. A. In the conclusion the author states the following : "Consequently, for the Diet's committees to be strengthened by becoming more autonomous..... substantial changes would have to be brought about within the entire society and the political system." (p. 356)

The view that the Diet is not a substantial legislative body but rather an ornamental one prevails in the perceptions of the Japanese academic world and of the voting public. However some researchers place emphasis on the importance of the Diet in policy making. For example, Mike Mochizuki argues as follows. "The unanimity norm on procedural questions in the Diet, the short deliberative sessions, the committee system, and the Diet's bicameral nature contribute to the viscosity of the parliamentary process." (p. iii) ("Viscosity" is the key concept of his analysis.) In spite of the predominant party system, Japanese opposition parties have substantial voice in the law making process. "At a time when much of the political science discipline speaks of the decline of parliament and party government, Japan presents the interesting phenomenon of a relatively viscous parliamentary process ..... ." (p. 464) (*Mike Mochizuki, Managing and Influencing the Japanese Legislative Process : The Role of Parties and the National Diet, 1982. This work is his unpublished doctoral thesis.*)  
*Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power : People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).*

The first sentence in this text is that “Japan perplexes the world” (p. 1 in the chap. 1 ‘the Japan Problem’). The author argues as follows : Japan’s formidable economic presence has made it a source of apprehension both to the Western countries and to some of its Asian neighbours. A problem child, Japan is a peculiar country (his emphasis on its peculiarity has given rise to a word on everybody’s lips ‘revisionism’). It is a fiction that Japan belongs to the category of economies known as ‘capitalist, free-market’ ones (the author labels Japan’s typical of ‘capitalist developmental states’ after the argument by Chalmers Johnson). Furthermore, it is a fiction that Japan is a sovereign state like any other, a state with central organs of government that can recognize what is good for the country and which bear ultimate responsibility for national decision-making.

The author, who was born in the Netherlands, has lived in Japan for over twenty-five years and has been active as a wellknown journalist. His description is very stimulating and his range is very wide.

In a free market economy, each player primarily pursues his or her own interest in a competitive arena. No player takes responsibility for the consequences that come to society as a whole. In the same way, no politician, bureaucrat, or business leader, each of whom is devotedly pursuing his or her own interest, seems to take responsibility for the whole nation.

*Ezra F. Vogel* (ed.), *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making* (University of California Press, 1975).

This work is composed of thirteen articles which analyse political, cultural, and educational organizations in present day Japan. Nine contributors are non-Japanese, and four are Japanese.

Our interest is attracted by the following argument of Vogel, the editor, in the Introduction : Toward More Accurate Concepts.

“A number of concepts currently used to describe various features of Japanese organization have taken on exaggerated importance in Western

scholarly literature. In part, the exaggeration occurs because observations at a particular time and place have been assumed to be general characteristics ..... In part it occurs because certain Japanese expressions are assumed to represent unique practices, which, upon closer examination, are not very different from practices in the United States or other Western countries.” (p. xv)

As an example, the editor describes how the notion that Japan behaves like one large corporation, that is, as ‘Japan, Incorporated’ causes some aspects of Japan to be vastly exaggerated (cf. ‘Big Business and Political Influence’ by Gerald L. Curties, in this work). The editor also indicates that *ringi sei* (the system whereby documents are drafted at lower levels of an organization and then circulated to various units for approval) is often not qualitatively different from the clearance system in the US government. (cf. ‘A Government Ministry : The Case of the MITI’ by Yoshihisa Ojima).

It is of interest that the editor evaluates the Japanese bureaucracy highly. He argues that the Japanese government has enjoyed high-quality leadership of considerable continuity as a result of the high quality and integrity of the bureaucrats who are also respected by the Japanese public. *Haruhiro, Fukui, Party in Power : The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy-making* (Australian National University Press, 1970).

The author observes the LDP’s policy-making process in detail and arrives at the conclusion outlined below. Though this research was carried out in the latter half of the 1960s’, his conclusions remain fundamentally true of the current situation.

The LDP is a typical ‘parliamentary party’. Its non-parliamentary membership is largely nominal and extremely unstable, and its local organization is weak and ineffective. As a result, the LDP is heavily dependent upon extra-party groups for the acquisition of funds and votes. In policy-making the LDP is compelled to provide these groups with some rewards. Due to

a lack of technical skill, the LDP has no choice but to depend on bureaucrats. The LDP is forced to take the interests of individual ministries into account. Furthermore, the LDP's decision making is deeply affected by interfactional conflicts.

*Paul S. Kim*, *Japan's Civil Service System: Its Structure, Personnel, and Politics* (Greenwood Press, 1988).

The author argues in the conclusion of this volume as follows: Japan's civil service system is relatively small and inexpensive, yet it is efficient in comparison with those of Western Europe and the U. S. A. The Japanese public service system succeeds in attracting talented people into it. The civil service system as a whole commands respect, and the morale of public employees remains high. The higher public service has been regarded as one of the most prestigious groups, and it has traditionally enjoyed greater power in the affairs of state than have the British or American bureaucracies.

However, the author describes several negative features, for example, the dominance of Tōkyō University graduates, the dominance of law and political science majors, and the lack of women.

*Akira Kubota*, *Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan: Their Social Origins, Educational Backgrounds, and Career Patterns* (Princeton University Press, 1969).

It is well known that Japanese researchers have been fond of denouncing their own bureaucracy. They charge it with excessive formalism, red tape, inefficiency, conservatism, corruption, and privileged "Amakudari". However, these charges do not seem to affect the sympathy of researchers abroad.

The author argues as follows. "These criticisms ... conceal the exact role of the Japanese bureaucracy. .... this group has been remarkably successful in administering a major nation and in implementing a large number of im-

portant social and economic policies”. (p. 173) It is interesting that the author remarks that the high homogeneity of the Japanese bureaucracy, based on graduation from Tōkyō University, has brought about its unity and continuity.

*B. C. Koh*, *Japan's Administrative Elite* (University of California Press, 1989).

The author's basic interest in Japan is due to its economic success. His intention is to explore the Japanese bureaucracy in relation to Japan's economic development. He makes the following observation. “The expansion of the Japanese economy has occurred not in a climate of *laissez-faire* but in a controlled environment ..... In other words, Japan's civil servants cannot be divorced from their country's accomplishments in the economic field as well as in other public-policy areas, such as crime control, environmental protection, and social welfare.” (in the preface)

The primary subject of this work is the analysis of the life cycle of the Japanese administrative elite. A study of how they are recruited, trained, promoted, rewarded, and retire.

The author indicates that Japan's higher civil servants constitute an “elite” in the country due to striking continuities with their antecedents in the prewar period, in spite of significant changes and a gradual weakening of their prestige.

The following argument of the author is of interest: The nexus between bureaucrats and politicians results in an unusually high degree of cooperation between them, which can be construed as functional ..... for the whole country. So called ‘*Amakudari*’ also brings vitality and fresh views into the bureaucracy, and bolsters the public sector's ability.

These results help to cause Japan's economic success, he argues in his conclusion. “If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, any objective observer cannot but be struck by the amazing development of the Japanese

economy, and ..... of the Japanese government. The latter in turn bespeaks the high efficiency of Japanese-government bureaucracy.” (p. 266)

*T. J. Pempel* (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan* (Cornell University Press, 1977).

This work consists of seven articles that analyze and describe in detail several issues in Japanese politics, and also of an Introduction and Conclusion by Pempel. The contributors are, Haruhiro Fukui (*Studies in Policymaking*) and (Tanaka goes to Peking) J. C. Campbell (*Compensation for Repatriates*), M. W. Donnelly (*Setting the Price of Rice*), M. A. McKean (*Pollution*), and B. M. Richardson (*Policymaking in Japan*).

The editor, Pempel concludes from these case studies the following: Japanese policymaking is extremely heterogeneous. Processes described in this book operate in strikingly different ways. “Finally, the wide differences in opinion and the ever shifting lines of political cleavage make it impossible to sustain any claim that policymaking in Japan involves the largely harmonious interaction between government and society that is implied in the notion of “Japan Inc”. (p. 310)

The following works concerns “Japan Inc.”, and were published previously: *E. J. Kaplan*, *Japan, The Government-Business Relationship*. (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1972), *Herman Kahn*, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (Prentice-Hall, 1970), and *E. F. Vogel* (ed.), *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-making*.

The editor Pempel argues in regard to the elitist-pluralist debate as follows. Some cases studied in this book come under the elitist model, however, some cases come under the pluralist model. Even in the former cases, it is not true that the same elite always fills the most significant role. Rather we can observe conflicts among them. In the latter cases, the opposition parties, local governments, citizens' groups, and public opinion often fill fairly important roles.

The editor concludes that “The studies in this book reveal some of the many complexities of Japanese policymaking and oversimplified judgments about the totality of that country’s politics and society” (p. 322).

*Chalmers Johnson*, *Japan’s Public Policy Companies* (American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

The relationship between governments and economies is the author’s primary interest. In this work he attempts to analyse Japan’s public corporations and mixed public-private enterprises. The author’s term “public policy company” is a wider concept than “public corporation”. His term covers companies ranging from those the most direct government connections to those with only tenuous connections.

The contents are as follows. 1 Orientations : The Japanese Government and Economy, 2 The Types of Public Policy Companies, 3 Origins, 4 Financing, 5 Control and Amakudari, 6 Government Corporations in the Energy Sector, 7 The Public Corporations and Bureaucratism.

The author places emphasis on the uniqueness of Japan in this point. He argues that the structure of Japanese public corporations and mixed public-private enterprises, which is quite common in all industrialized societies, functions quite differently from the way it does in most comparable countries. He argues, furthermore, that institutions, such as parliaments and corporations do not work in the same way that they do in the countries from which they were borrowed.

The author stresses the leading role of MITI in this work. He indicates that it controls twenty-seven public corporations (as of 1975), more than any other ministry or agency. We can understand that this work lead on to his famous masterwork, “MITI and the Japanese Miracle” published in 1982. *The Management and Coordination Agency* (ed.), *Organization of the Government of Japan* (Public Administration Research Center, 1992).

This is a useful handbook in English for learning about the Japanese

government organization. It gives the English names of the major bureaus and departments of all the ministries and agencies. It also gives a brief account of the functions of each body including advisory councils and public corporations.

The Political Economy of Japan (three vols) (Stanford University Press, 1987).

Volume one is edited by *Kōzō Yamamura* and *Yasuba Yasukichi*. It is composed of thirteen articles, mainly concerned with the economy. Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss contribute an article entitled 'The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism'. In this article they argue as follows: "Japanese policymaking is characterized by a strong state with its own autonomous interests and an institutionalized accommodation among elites, interacting with pluralist elements. We have called this hybrid state, variations of which we believe exists in several European democracies, "patterned pluralism". (p. 537)

Volume two is edited by *Takashi Inoguchi* and *Daniel Okimoto*. Fourteen articles were contributed to this volume. Those monographs are on the world system and Japan's role. Donald Hellmann argues as follows in his article, 'Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an American Greenhouse': Despite the prevalence of pluralism as an ideology and as an analytical model, Japan is an elitist democracy. So, too, are all other modern "democratic" nations. Elitism and statism have been conspicuous throughout the history of modern Japanese politics. Hereditary LDP politicians, "quasi-brokered" marriage among business leaders, bureaucrats and politicians, and "descent from heaven" are emblematic of the elitism which coexists with democracy.

The editors of Volume Three are *Shumpei Kumon* and *Henry Rosovski*. It includes twelve articles. These primarily analyse economic, social and cultural aspects of Japan.

## (2) Pressure Groups

### CONTENTS

- 1 Outline
- 2 Managers' Organizations
- 3 Workers' Organizations
- 4 Other Pressure Groups
- 5 Comparative Analysis with Britain and the United States of America
- 6 Theoretical Analysis
- 7 Further Readings

#### 1 *Outline*

##### (1) *Main Pressure Group*

##### 1 *Business Organizations*

It can be confidently said that business organizations are the most powerful of the various kinds of pressure groups in present day Japan. Generally speaking, business organizations are most influential in developed countries based on a free market economy.

The principal national organizations of business in Japan today are: the Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan Federation of Employer's Associations and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In Japanese they are known as "Keidanren", "Nikkeiren" and "Nihon-shokokaigisho".

The Federation of Economic Organizations is the most prestigious. Large enterprises in individual industries form themselves into nationwide organizations. The Federation of Economic Organizations is the federation

consisting of these organizations.

The managers of large enterprises in each industry and prefecture form themselves into managers' associations. The Japan Federation of Employer's Association is composed of these managers' associations.

Individual cities all around Japan have their own Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry consists of these local Chambers. From the quantitative point of view, the members of these chambers are mainly medium sized or small sized companies. Such companies outnumber larger companies overwhelmingly.

It needs hardly be said that large enterprises are the leaders in the business world. Though they are far fewer in number than small or medium sized enterprises, they are far more dominant.

The Federation of Economic Organizations is, in fact, a meeting of heads of large companies. Inside the Japan Chamber, the leading figures are the heads of large companies. The former is more prestigious and powerful because it does not include minor companies.

## *2 Workers' and other Organizations*

The Confederation of Trade Unions is prominent among national workers' organizations in today's Japan. The Japanese name for this confederation is "Rengō". The General Council of Trade Unions, the Confederation of Labour and other national organizations merged and formed themselves into the Confederation of Trade Unions several years ago.

The General Council of Trade Unions was a comparatively militant organization consisting mainly of civil servants' unions. The Japanese name for this organization is "Sohyō". The Confederation of Labour was moderate. It consisted mainly of private sector trade unions. Its Japanese name is "Dōmei".

These two organizations have already dissolved themselves as a matter of form. However, in actuality, both continue to act independently inside the

Confederation of Trade Unions. In this sense, this Confederation is a confederation between the General Council of Trade Unions and the Confederation of Labour.

The General Council supports the SDPJ. On the other hand, the Confederation of Labour supports the DSP. The Confederation of Trade Unions has yet to demonstrate firm solidarity. Indeed, the gap between both these groups is often evident.

In the case of the so-called Peace Keeping Cooperation Bill, the Social Democrats expressed vehement opposition, while the Democratic Socialists supported its passing along with the LDP. In such a situation the Confederation of Trade Unions meets difficulties.

The agricultural sector is not important in present day Japan from the economic point of view. However farmers and exfarmers, as well as those people who engage in farming activities on a non-full time basis have organized themselves into a powerful pressure group.

This farmers' organization is often called the "Agricultural Cooperative". In Japanese it is often called "Nōkyō". It has built a stronghold in rural constituencies and exerts strong influence over the Liberal Democrats.

The Japan Medical Association is the most powerful of the professional organizations. The doctors are prestigious and wealthy. They often have close connections with conservative politicians, in particular.

There are many other pressure groups. Some newly rising religious sects are very powerful. Many kinds of citizens' group are also active.

## (2) *main routes for lobbying*

### 1 *Lobbying Bureaucrats, Public Advisory Councils and "Amakudari"*

Bureaucrats have been the main target of such lobbying since the "Meiji" Restoration. Today they still rank almost equal with conservative politicians as the main target of lobbyists in the political sphere.

Bureaucrats were most powerful in pre-war Japan. Though their influence has declined since then, many pressure groups and individual persons often lobby bureaucrats.

Public advisory councils occupy vital strategic points in the policy-making process. Bureaucrats formulate ordinary bills or budgetary bills in substance. However, they must pay close attention to reports submitted by public advisory councils. It is a most effective form of lobbying for pressure groups to secure reserved seats on these councils.

Many members of these councils, especially those concerned with economic policy, are leaders of the financial community. Labour organizations hold the seats in councils concerned with labour politics. The Medical Association or the Agricultural Cooperatives hold seats on councils debating medical policy or agricultural policy.

The Japanese word "Amakudari" means "descent from heaven". Originally it referred to the Emperors' descent from heaven to earth. However, Japanese often use this word to indicate the reemployment of bureaucrats following their retirement.

Many large enterprises employ such bureaucrats in amazingly good conditions. Needless to say, this is done to exert influence on the administration. For instance, banks hire former senior civil servants from the Finance Ministry and shower them with respect. Reemployment of former bureaucrats by large companies promotes a cozy relationship between the administration and business. It may be called a form of structural corruption.

## 2 *Lobbying Parties*

In principle, the Diet is the highest organ of the state. According to the Constitution, individual Diet members are the independent representatives of the whole nation.

However, in practice parties hold decisive power. Party headquarters

and party leaders are all powerful in Japanese politics. Powerful pressure groups usually lobby not individual parliamentarians but party leaders.

### 3 *Characteristics of Japanese Pressure Groups*

*Directed Mainly at Bureaucrats* : The two major targets of lobbying are politicians and bureaucrats in general. Pressure groups endeavour to form close ties with party politicians and senior civil servants, just as in western countries.

Lobbying directed at bureaucrats is more effective in Japan than in western countries such as Britain and the United States. As I mentioned earlier, bureaucrats were traditionally the real rulers in Japan.

*“Keiretsu”, Insiders and Outsiders* : Japanese “corporate groupings” are famous or perhaps infamous. The Japanese word “Keiretsu” means “grouping”. Other “grouping”s between pressure groups and parties are also well-known.

The financial world and the Liberal Democrats have formed themselves into one grouping. Large enterprises or their managers provide financial support to the LDP, its factions and individual conservative politicians. The managers cannot be outsiders in the conservative political world.

Labour organizations form another grouping with the opposition parties. The General Council of Trade Unions group forms a grouping with the SDPJ. On the other hand, the Confederation of Labour group forms a grouping with the DSP.

Insiders who have close ties with the LDP and/or bureaucrats are powerful lobbyists. It may be more correct to say that these insiders are not simply insiders but are in fact members of policy-making groups. On the contrary, outsiders who possess no strong connections with either the LDP or the bureaucrats, are lobbyists without power. Their lobbying is ineffective even if they appear to be superficially powerful.

*The Weakness of Public Interest Groups* : Civil groups or civil activities

aimed at protecting the environment, human rights and other things, are not very active.

On this point there is a striking contrast between Japan and the United States.

Many civil groups in Japan are typical outsiders. They neither have seats on any public advisory councils nor connections with powerful Liberal Democrats and/or bureaucrats. It seems to be a major cause of civil groups' weakness that they are complete outsiders.

## 2 *Managers' Organizations*

### (1) *the Federation of Economic Organizations*

*History*: the so-called "zaibatsu" were leading figures of the business world in prewar Japan. After the conclusion of World War II, "zaibatsu" were dissolved by the Occupation Forces who endeavored to democratize the economy. The organization of large enterprises was also dissolved.

The Federation of Economic Organizations was founded in 1946. This marked the reconstruction of the business world in post war Japan. However, the Federation made itself into a powerful leading influence only after economic recovery and the start of economic growth. It is the most powerful pressure group in today's Japan. The president of the Federation of Economic Organizations is often called "the Prime Minister of the business world". He or she is the counterpart of the Premier of the political world.

*Structure*: Individual industries formed themselves into industrial associations consisting of the large enterprises concerned. The Federation of Economic Organizations is the federation of those Industrial Associations.

The head of this organization, or President, is the top leader of the business community. Under the President there are several vice-Presidents and other senior officials who lead this enormous organization. These officials

are all presidents or chairmen of large powerful enterprises. This organization is therefore governed by the top managers of giant enterprises.

Many committees are active. Many of these exhibit deep interest in government policy and administration, especially economic policy.

*Role*: The fundamental purpose of this organization is to create and maintain order in the business world. However, this may sound too extreme. It may be better to say that its fundamental purpose is to coordinate the conflicts of interest among industries or among enterprises.

Its activities as a pressure group aim at maintaining the free market economy. This organization is acting, so to speak, from the standpoint of the whole business world.

*Lobbying*: The Federation of Economic Organizations has placed the LDP under its complete financial patronage. Enormous amounts of political funds are funneled to the LDP from the business world through the National Political Association. This Association is a kind of dummy. It was never been a substantial entity.

The Federation assigns a certain amount to individual industrial associations, who then divide these funds among individual enterprises. A large part of the LDP's financial base is donated by large enterprises through this system.

The leaders of the business world are perfect insiders in the realm of conservative politics thanks to the financial support they provide. However, these financial contributions are made not in order to seek specific profits, but rather to sustain the free market economy. Political funds are donated deliberately through the National Political Association on the condition of anonymity for all enterprises. This is done to avoid accusations of corruption.

The business world sends many leaders to work on a variety of public advisory councils. The Presidents of almost all councils which relate to

economic or financial policies are leading figures in the business community. They are also complete insiders in government offices.

Large enterprises develop other influential connections with government offices. Individual large enterprises appoint former senior government officials to high ranking positions. Their reemployment is known as the “descent from heaven”.

In prewar Japan senior bureaucrats enjoyed prestigious positions as trusted servants of the Emperor. Managers of private companies and the public at large revered them. Wealthy companies vied with each other to offer them high positions. It is for this reason that these appointments were called “descent from heaven”.

It is an unwritten rule that senior bureaucrats should voluntarily retire to make way for younger colleagues. Nowadays it is more difficult for them to acquire a good position following their retirement. They have less prestige and wealth than managers of large enterprises. Their reemployment can no longer be interpreted as a “descent from heaven”.

## (2) *the Japan Federation of Employer's Association*

*History and Structure*: This association was established in 1948. The reason for its foundation was to counter the labour movement. The trade union movement was being lifted up under the patronage of the Occupied Forces as a repercussion of its suppression during the war.

Trade unions organized themselves according to two systems: one by industry and the other by region. Trade Unions in each prefecture formed themselves into prefectural organizations. Like the trade union movement the Federation of Employer's Associations is also composed of the two organizations. One of these organizations is based on industrial lines. The other is prefectural based. These dual organizations allow the Federation of Employer's Association to counter the impact of the trade union movement

whose membership is organized along the same lines.

*Role and Lobbying* : Many senior official posts in this Employer's Association are served concurrently by presidents or chairmen of large enterprises. Judged from this point of view, it appears to be the same body as the Federation of Economic Organizations. But in reality, it is the directors or department chiefs in charge of labour management who handle this Employer's Federation. It is, thus, a second class business organization which substantially consists of department chiefs.

As mentioned earlier, lobbying for the business world as a whole is exercised by the Federation of Economic Organizations. Lobbying carried out by the Employers' Federation is limited mainly to the dimension of labour policy.

### (3) *the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry*

*History and Structure* : The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was established in 1922. It was restructured after the war into its current form. About five hundred cities, almost all cities in Japan have their own Chambers of Commerce and Industry. A lot of small and medium sized firms join these Chambers. The Tōkyō Chamber is the most powerful. The reason is that the majority of large enterprises have their head offices in Tōkyō.

*Role and Lobbying* : The role of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry is to organize small and medium sized companies under the control of big business.

The principal lobbyist of the national government is the Federation of Economic Organizations. In local politics, however, the chambers in individual cities are the main actors for the local business communities. The individual Chambers often endorse candidates in elections for the head of local government. Sometimes they do so in national elections.

(4) *The Japan Association of Corporative Executives*

The original name of this organization is “Keizai-Doyukai”. The leaders of the business world formed themselves into this organization as individual managers. The other three organizations of the business world introduced earlier consist not of individual managers but of companies.

The top officials of this Association of Corporative Executives often make radical remarks which are then covered by the media. But the Association is not so influential. Although it is often said that the business world is composed of these four organizations, the main one is the Federation of Economic Organizations while the other three organizations are of secondary importance.

(5) *Other Organizations*

The business world cooperates only to maintain a free market economy. The individual industries, including the smaller trade associations, seek their own interests and compete with each other. Each industrial association lobbys against the others. The factions of the LDP keep their own political funds. Individual industrial associations donate money to the factions or the faction leaders. Associations usually contribute to all factions. However we can see connections between particular industries and particular factions. For example, there were strong ties between the construction industry and the former “Takeshita” faction.

Individual politicians, many of whom are Liberal Democrats while some are opposition politicians, also receive donations from industrial associations. Some of these associations often electioneer for politicians, no doubt in order to seek their favour.

Under a free market system, individual enterprises in the same industry compete with each other. Individual companies contribute money to individual politicians. It is as difficult to distinguish pure contributions from

tacit bribery as it is to tell black rats from grey rats. It is very unclear whether the purpose of electioneering by such companies is to promote good politics or to promote their own profit.

The “descent from heaven” which I described earlier makes it possible to place the bureaucrats under the thumb of the business world. However, it also makes it possible for companies to profit or at least to avoid being disadvantaged by government activities.

### 3 *Worker's Organizations*

#### (1) *the Confederation of Trade Unions*

*History*: The worker's movement in Japan was organized mainly into three national organizations for many years: the General Council of Trade Unions, the Confederation of Labour and the Federation of Independent Unions.

The leaders of moderate trade unions sought to merge these organizations during the 1970s. Private sector trade unions formed a loose federation at the beginning of the 1980s.

The predecessor of the current Confederation of Trade Unions was established in 1987. Many public sector unions joined this Confederation in 1989 and it became the largest workers' organization in Japanese history.

The most important fact in the history of the Confederation is that it was created under the leadership of moderate or rather company oriented trade unions. Its Japanese name is “Rengō”. “Trade Union Confederation” is also used as the English translation. The Japanese word “Rengō” means confederation or alliance.

*Structure*: The trade Union Confederation has never been a united body but is rather a mosaic consisting of several organizations. Although they are able to coexist, they nevertheless compete and sometimes fight fiercely with each other.

The Confederation has two bases: an industrial base and a regional base. It is therefore a confederation of national organizations of industry based trade unions and also a confederation of prefecturally based regional organizations. In general, trade unions join both an industrial and a regional organization.

However, trade unions affiliated to the former General Council of Trade Unions and trade unions affiliated to the former Confederation of Labour now form their own factions and compete with each other both on a national and a local level.

*Role and Lobbying*: Pressure groups usually do not provide election candidates. However, the Trade Union Confederation has often participated in recent elections by running their own candidates. Candidates elected to the House of Councillors on the ticket of the Confederation have formed themselves into one group in the Upper House.

The political activity of the Confederation is sometimes confronted by a dilemma. The Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill, for example, was very problematic. The reason was that in spite of the vehement opposition of the SDPJ, the DSP approved this bill along with the LDP. In principle, the Confederation maintains a neutral stance towards these two parties. It is unable to work in a situation of severe conflict between these two parties.

One possibility is that the Confederation will seek a direct connection with the LDP in order to lobby the government more effectively. The Confederation endorsed a candidate with the LDP in the 1991 'Tokyo' gubernatorial election. The future of the Confederation of Trade Unions is very unclear.

## (2) *the former General Council of Trade Unions*

*History*: During the latter half of the 1940s the trade union movement was controlled by the Japan Communist Party. However trade unions and

activists that supported the SDPJ succeeded in tapering back this hegemony partly as a consequence of the so-called red purge undertaken by the Occupation Forces.

The supporters of the SDPJ established a new national organization, the General Council of Trade Unions. Although the United States and Japanese Conservatives had expected this new Council to be moderate and conciliatory towards them, it became a stronghold of pacifists and anti-LDP activists.

*Structure* : The General Council was a federation consisting of national organizations of trade unions organized by industry. Its main pillars were public sector unions. These civil servant unions were leftist and comparatively militant.

The mainstream of the Council supported the SDPJ. On the other hand, the anti-mainstream supported the JCP. The latter did not seek to join, or was not permitted to join the Trade Union Confederation. It seceded and formed itself into a new minor national organization.

The General Council continues to act as a regional body at the prefectural and municipal levels. Many officials of these prefectural organizations have stood for election on the ticket of the SDPJ.

*Role and Lobbying* : The General Council also continued to provide the SDPJ with candidates, political funds and election canvassers. Seats in assemblies, including local assemblies are, so to speak, prepared for trade union officers as their “descent from heaven” through the medium of elections.

It is questionable whether the General Council was lobbying the SDPJ or the SDPJ was merely the political wing of the General Council.

Quite a few members of public advisory bodies are trade union officers. Many are also officers of the Trade Union Confederation and leaders of the former General Council group or the former Confederation of Labour

group. Their lobbying through the channel of advisory councils is exercised not only for the labour world as a whole, but also for their own industrial trade unions and industries.

(3) *The former Confederation of Labour*

*History and Structure* : After the SDPJ split in 1960, the moderate trade unions within the General Council of Trade Unions provided firm support for the DSP. These trade unions organized themselves into a new national organization, the Confederation of Labour, with other trade unions from outside the General Council.

The Confederation has promoted the formation of the Trade Union Confederation in concert with right wing trade unions in the General Council.

As for structure, the Confederation was built on a double base just like the General Council.

*Role and Lobbying* : The connection between the Confederation and the DSP was similar to that which exists between the General Council and the SDPJ. Behind the scenes, the leaders of the Confederation often built strong ties with the Liberal Democrats and managers of their enterprises. On the other hand, the Confederation was supported by far fewer activists at the grass-roots level than was the General Council.

Two routes that facilitate 'descent from heaven' are open to officers of trade unions affiliated to the former Confederation of Labour. One route is to be elected to a representative assembly. The other is to be promoted to managerial posts in their own companies.

(4) *The former Confederation of Independent Trade Unions*

This was the third largest national organization of trade unions. It considered collaboration between managers and workers to be desirable. Its standpoint was fundamentally moderate, like the Confederation of Labour.

The political standpoint of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions was non partisan. However it actually supported the DSP and the SDPJ's right wing. It seldom provided support for its left wing members. The main pillars of this Confederation were private sector unions like the Confederation of Labour.

(5) *The National Confederation of Trade Unions*

As mentioned earlier, the General Council of Trade Unions organized itself under SDPJ hegemony. However, the JCP gradually increased its influence inside the General Council of Trade Unions. Under JCP leadership the trade unions established themselves as a militant anti-mainstream force following the secession of moderate trade unions which formed themselves into the Confederation of Labour.

These JCP oriented trade unions did not or could not participate in the foundation of the Confederation of Trade Unions. They formed themselves into a new national organization called the National Confederation of Trade Unions. It's Japanese name is Zenrōren.

During the 1960's, the SDPJ and the JCP often collaborated with each other, though often reluctantly. The JCP became isolated from other opposition parties, including the SDPJ, during the 1980s.

The unification of the labour movement, namely the establishment of the Confederation of Trade Unions, indicated an effort to expel the JCP from the labour world.

(6) *Other Organizations*

*National organizations of trade unions based on industry*: The labour world has never exhibited great unity. Many industrial trade unions compete with each other in order to maintain their own industrial or political interests.

Many SDPJ or DSP Upper House members elected according to the

Proportional Representation are representatives of individual industrial trade unions. It can be said that they belong to their industrial workers' organizations first and to their parties second.

*Individual trade unions* : These industry based national organizations of trade unions are also federations of individual enterprise based trade unions. Prefectural based trade union organizations are also federated.

The leaders of these national or prefectural organizations are, whether or not they are members of a representative assembly, basically representatives of their own trade unions. The electioneering for ex-trade union officers is carried out mainly by their own trade unions for reasons of pride and for the interests of the trade unions concerned.

#### (7) *the Characteristics of Japanese Trade Unions*

*Enterprise Unions* : Trade unions in Japan are not literally 'trade unions'. The traditional trade union in Western societies is organized on the basis of a 'trade' or an occupational skill.

On the other hand, workers' organizations in Japan are organized on the basis of a company. Employees of an enterprise organize themselves into one employees' union, irrespective of their occupational skills.

The loyalty of trade union members is seldom directed towards the working class as a whole, but to their own companies. Trade unions cast in their lots with their employers. 'Class struggle' is often a meaningless slogan even for militant trade unions. Although never spoken, unionists know that their unions cannot survive without the prosperity of the company.

At the same time it is often the case that different trade unions fight each other within the same workshop. The differences between them lie not in occupational skills, but in their political stances. Five or more unions are now fighting each other within the Japan Railway enterprises. These unions

support the SDPJ, the DSP, the JCP, Kōmeitō and a radical leftist group respectively.

*Company Unions* : Many such enterprise unions seem to be substantially company or company oriented unions.

Workers who have organized themselves into trade unions work mostly for large enterprises. They are, so to speak, a 'labour aristocracy' in comparison with the workers of small and medium sized firms. It goes without saying that they are far more privileged than workers in developing countries.

The Japanese trade union movement seems to be basically conservative because of economic prosperity. My feeling is that trade union officers are a second class elite behind their managers. Precisely because both groups are members of the social elite they are able to cooperate with each other, at least behind the scenes. This will not change until the trade union officers decide that they really do want to rise from their second class position to that of a first class elite, equal or better than their managers.

#### 4 *Other Pressure Groups*

##### (1) *Farmers' Organizations*

The agricultural industry is not of great economic importance in contemporary Japan. Nevertheless, farmers' organizations continue to maintain their political influence.

National or local organizations of agricultural cooperatives allege their neutrality. However, in actual fact they primarily support the Liberal Democrats. Farmers exercise a kind of casting vote in rural constituencies. These days they do not form a majority even in rural areas. But they cooperate closely and pressure conservative politicians effectively. This is one reason why the Japanese rice market has not yet been opened.

(2) *Professional Organizations*

The most powerful professional organization is the Japan Medical Association. Medical Associations possess a more than adequate financial base, expert knowledge and connections with politicians and social elites in many countries.

Other professionals have also organized themselves into interest groups. Their lobbying is effective but not as effective as that of the Medical Association.

(3) *Religious Organizations*

So called “new religion” sects exert a strong influence on Japanese politics. Typically, “Sōka-Gakkai” operates a major opposition party “Kōmeitō”. “Rishō-kōsei-kai”, “Seichō-no-Ie” and others are also powerful political forces.

With the exception of Sōka-gakkai, these religious organizations provide support primarily for the LDP. To some degree, however, they also sometimes support the DSP. For example, they provide labour for electioneering work.

Established religions such as Buddhism or Shintōism stand rather aloof from politics. Although a large number of people often visit temples or shrines, these traditional religious practices are simple customs for many Japanese. Politics is hardly influenced, at least directly, by these religions.

5 *Mass Media and Public Opinion*

It goes without saying that although not a pressure group, the mass media also exerts a strong influence on Japanese politics. TV and newspaper coverage is most influential.

In principle, the Japanese media is politically neutral. However, the “Asahi-Shinbun”, for example, seems to be progressive while on the other

hand, the “Yomiuri-Shinbun” seems to be conservative.

Almost all sections of the mass media gave extensive coverage to the peoples anger at the ‘Recruit’ bribery scandal and the consumption tax introduced before and during the 1989 Upper House general election. It is said that this coverage exerted a strong influence on the outcome of the election.

It took ten years for the LDP government to introduce the consumption tax (an indirect tax) beginning with the “Ōhira” administration’s failure. A major cause of the ten year’s delay seems to have been the media’s campaign against the tax.

Electoral forecasts based on opinion polls published in the media are said to affect voting behavior. Such forecasts may promote so-called strategic voting. The LDP once attempted to place a legal restriction on the media’s electoral forecasts, but abandoned its efforts in the face of strong protest from media industries and opposition parties. The media as a whole does not seem to cover LDP politics from a LDP viewpoint.

On the other hand, the media demonstrates sensitivity to the plight of ordinary citizens. Most people are not satisfied with the LDP government, even those who vote it.

Voters who do not organize themselves into influential pressure groups are not very powerful, however they are not absolutely powerless either. Their displeasure led the LDP to its shameful defeat in the 1989 general election, and the opposition parties’ new majority in the Upper House.

## 6 *Comparative Analysis with Britain and U. S. A.*

### (1) *Comparison with British Pressure Group*

*The British Financial World and the Japanese Financial World*: The main organizations are the Confederation of British Industry and British Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The former organization seems to be the

counterpart of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations and the latter is the counterpart of Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

The Confederation of British Industry is the most influential business organization in Britain. But the latter is far less important than the CBI. (CBI is the popular abbreviation for the Confederation of British Industry.)

It goes without saying that individual industrial or trade associations and individual enterprises are lobbying for their own interests.

*The British TUC and the Japan Trade Union Confederation*: The British Trade Union Congress (TUC) is one of the most traditional and powerful workers' organizations in the world.

The TUC was founded in 1868. It is a confederation of national organizations of individual industrial unions. Traditionally, British trade unions really are "trade" unions, groupings of workers who have the same skills.

The TUC established its political or electoral department with a few minor socialist groups in 1900. This department was the forerunner to the British Labour Party. It was only following the First World War that the Labour Party was established as a party in both name and substance.

About half of Britain's workers are organized by the TUC. The working class movement is not so powerful when we consider this high rate of organization. TUC is a loose federation of many national industrial organizations. The central headquarters does not possess sufficient funds, staff or authority.

The large industrial workers organizations exercise a lot of power in the TUC through the use of so called block votes. Voting in the Congress is carried out not on the basis of the principle of one union one vote, but in proportion to the number of members belonging to individual national industrial organizations.

The Japan Trade Union Confederation can be said to be the counterpart of the TUC. Although the TUC is basically the only national organization in

the British labour world, the Japanese Confederation must compete with minor but powerful rivals. It organizes far fewer workers than the TUC in terms of the ratio of unionized workers. It is also less than ten years old. Its two wings support the SDPJ and the DSP respectively.

The Japan Trade union Confederation has never been as influential as the TUC, which has supported the British Labour Party and maintained unity for many years.

(2) *Comparison with Lobbying in Britain*

*Similarities* : Public advisory councils have a formal and influential voice in the policy-making process and administration of both countries. Powerful interest groups seek the appointment of their members to advisory bodies.

Strong ties between interest groups and political parties can be seen in both countries. Both business worlds support, primarily by financial means, their respective conservative parties, namely the LDP and the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party also depends heavily on large companies.

Trade unions in both countries, on the other hand, support the social democratic parties, namely the SDPJ and the British Labour Party. Trade Unions provide the parties with political funds and canvassers.

*Differences* : The British people have not created a custom similar to the 'descent from heaven'. Although in Britain it is also necessary to lobby senior civil servants, large enterprises employ few former bureaucrats in high positions. The business world lobbies ministers or politicians directly, or indirectly through advisory bodies.

Quite a few LDP Diet members hold managerial positions in firms or held them before entering the political world. This is the same in Britain.

Japanese conservatives usually manage or managed medium sized companies. However their British counterparts are in large part the directors of large size and high ranking enterprises.

Liberal Democrats seldom retire from the political world in their sixties. On the other hand, British Conservatives do retire at this time or even earlier, and return to the business world. These two facts seem to be related.

The greater part of British Labour Party membership consists of trade unionist. This is a consequence of group membership. Individual trade unions join the Party as a whole. The British Labour Party, however, runs only a few incumbent or former trade union officers on its ticket.

The SDPJ and DSP, on the other hand, consist of individual party members who join as individuals. Nevertheless these Japanese parties put up trade union officers as candidates.

The British Labour Party recruits many candidates from outside of the labour world and has established itself as a national party in substance. However the SDPJ and DSP are national parties only in principle. In actual fact they are, so to speak, trade union parties.

### 3 *Comparison with Pressure Group in the United States*

*Similarities*: Influential pressure groups in Japan are business organizations, workers' organizations, farmers' organizations, professional organizations and others that I mentioned earlier. From this perspective, the range of pressure groups in Japan is about the same as that in the United States.

Wellknown business organizations in the U. S. are the Business Round Table and the U. S. Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The largest workers' organization is the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization : the AFL and CIO merged and formed the AFL-CIO in 1955). Several farmers organizations and the American Medical Association are also influential.

*Differences*: In terms of ratio, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations organizes more enterprises, while the Confederation of Trade Unions organize more workers than their counterpart organizations in the

U. S. We can probably safely say that Japanese workers organize themselves less effectively than British workers but more effectively than American workers. There is a large party based on socialism in Japan that is perpetually in opposition. On the other hand, no socialist party is active in the U. S. This is a consequence of the weakness of organized labour there.

Public interest groups which promote public rather than private interests are far less evident in Japan than in the U. S. In Japan, there is no public interest group similar to the U. S. Common Cause group. The Common Cause is wellknown for its promotion of political reform. Japanese environmental conservation groups and human rights protection groups are also weaker than those in the U. S.

#### 4 *Comparison with Lobbying in the U. S.*

*Lobbyists*: Professional lobbyists are agents who receive money from clients, and lobby on their behalf. Professional lobbyists are assured of brilliant futures with extremely high paying positions in American politics. All citizens and organizations can employ lobbyists, provided of course that they possess sufficient funds to pay for their services.

There are no professional lobbyists in Japan. Politicians, however, often receive donations from clients and lobby bureaucrats behind the scenes. Japanese politicians could perhaps be viewed as a kind of lobby group occasionally working as legislators on the side while being paid from the National Treasury.

The leaders of interest groups in Japan cannot be appointed to senior civil servants' positions, no matter how powerful their groups are. In the U. S., however, senior positions in government departments are available to interest group leaders. The President possesses the right to select and appoint talented persons from outside of the civil service. Influential interest groups can induce or persuade the President.

Effective lobbying in Japan takes place within the ruling groups. Many ambitious persons and organizations seek to forge human relationships with powerful politicians or bureaucrats.

Grass roots lobbying is not as popular in Japan as in the U.S.

*Indirect lobbying*: Efforts to mold public opinion and the ideas of constituents does not appear to be effective in Japan.

Many pressure groups maintain strong ties with specific parties. For example, business organizations, agricultural cooperatives, the Medical Association and others form “Keiretsu” with the LDP. Trade unions do the same with opposition parties. The LDP’s long term in government combined with wide political gulf which exists between the LDP and the other parties seems to stimulate these ties.

Many pressure groups in the U.S. do not establish a close relationship with either of the two major parties. Regular changes of political power, the narrow political differences between the two parties and their loose discipline seems to promote this phenomenon.

## 7 *Theoretical Analysis*

### (1) *What are Pressure Group?*

*“Eruption of Groups”*: Following industrialization, especially during the early 20th century, many groups have emerged. The famous British political researcher, Ernest Barker, has termed this phenomenon the “eruption of groups”.

These interest groups conduct their lobbying under positive governments. Interest groups which lobby governments and the policy-making process can be called pressure groups. Almost all interest groups function as pressure groups in modern society, where large governments interfere in the economic activities and social lives of ordinary people. The terms ‘pressure group’ and ‘interest group’ are therefore often used to indicate the

same thing.

*Positive Government*: Generally speaking, positive governments promote the development of pressure groups. In the case of Japan, pressure groups developed rapidly after the war. In prewar Japan there was no democracy, a precondition of lobbying. Although the government was extraordinarily positive after the Meiji Restoration, lobbying, and especially grass roots lobbying, was almost nonexistent for many years.

It may safely be said that government activity in Japan exceeds that of the U. S. but falls short of the British model. Japanese administrative guidance is, however, famous or perhaps notorious. Some commentators argue that the Japanese government's control over the economy is a kind of communism.

(2) *Relations among Parties, Government and Pressure Groups*

*The LDP, the Bureaucrats and the Business World*: There is no doubt that the LDP, the bureaucrats and the leaders of the business world are extremely powerful when compared to other actors and ordinary citizens. However, it is less clear how these three groups are related to each other and to what extent they dominate the society.

From the orthodox Marxist viewpoint, these three groups form themselves into a ruling class. Although the business leaders are the true rulers and the most powerful of the three, these three groups portray themselves as solidly unified, a trinity, to the classes who are being ruled.

Nevertheless it is dubious whether such a classic framework can be used effectively to analyse present Japanese politics. The difference between the classic class societies of the nineteenth century and the developed societies which have emerged following high economic growth seems too great.

From the perspective of typical elite theory, these three groups form

themselves into one elite ruling circle. It is certain that the ties among them seem to be strong judging from political donations, blood ties forged through marriages, "Amakudari" and so on. Marriage between sons and daughters of these groups and within individual groups often take place.

However, it is equally certain that each group constantly competes and often quarrels with the other two.

Indeed it is highly questionable as to whether they are acting cooperatively or conspiring against each other. There must also be some doubt as to whether the difference between these three groups and the rest of the population is so great as to categorize the former as elites and the latter as a mass. In the framework of elite theory, non-elites are called a mass.

*A Tripartite Deadlock or is One Sector Dominant?* : Some commentators explain the relationship as follows. The LDP dominates bureaucrats. It is the politicians who possess the formal right of policy-making. Although the bureaucrats often endeavour to outmanouver politicians, in the final analysis they have no option but to obey the politicians' wishes.

Meanwhile the business world dominates the LDP on account of its political donations. The LDP can do nothing without the financial support of the business sector. However bureaucrats dominate the business sector through various legal restrictions and strict administrative guidances.

In recent years, many commentators insist that the LDP is dominant over bureaucrats and the business world. The declining power of bureaucrats seems to be unquestionable. The LDP's dominance over the business world may be temporary however. Superiority or inferiority between these two groups may depend on their leadership. A generational change among leaders may alter the present configuration of power.

### (3) *Pluralism?*

*What is Pluralism?* : Politics in the U. S. is usually explained by the term

'pluralism'. It is said that American politics is composed of multiple parties, many pressure groups and numerous other components which compete freely with each other. This plurality combined with free competition is claimed to be the characteristic feature of democracy or pluralism in the U. S..

Despite this contention, the lower classes and colored people seldom organize themselves into powerful pressure groups. Despite equality of chance existing as a matter of form, it is the upper or middle classes that have organized themselves into influential interest groups. In this sense it can be said that lobbying is available only to social elites.

Nevertheless American society seems to be more pluralistic than any other country.

*Is Japan a Plural Society?*: One party has maintained its long dominance despite the existence of multiple parties and free competition at the party politics level. Several huge pressure groups are overwhelmingly dominant and are perfect insiders at the level of pressure politics.

Relations among the three major groups, namely the LDP, the business world and the bureaucrats, do not suggest a system of perfect competition. More often than not we are provided with indications of a loose federation divided by internal discord.

The competition between the big three and the rest of society can not be categorized as free competition between equals. Many rivalries often involve tacit conspiracy behind the scenes: for example between managers and trade union officers, and between Liberal Democrats and opposition politicians.

Japan is rather a monistic or totalitarian society. Defining Japan as a plural society might require a different definition of the term pluralism.

(4) *Corporatism?*

*What is Corporatism?* : In some countries, such as Austria or Germany (the former West Germany), governments and huge interest groups discuss and decide important policies in substance. These policies are authorized by parliament following their negotiations.

This type of decision making or politics is often called corporatism. Some commentators use the term neo corporatism or liberal corporatism to distinguish between present day corporatism and the older fascist model.

In Japan many policies are decided by negotiation among the LDP, bureaucrats and influential interest groups. The Japanese political process may therefore be classified as a kind of corporatism. In other countries, however, powerful trade union organizations are considered to indispensable components of corporatism. Japanese workers' organizations are far less influential than those of Austria or Germany. Some Commentators therefore describe 'Japanese corporatism' as 'Corporatism without labour'. It is arguable however, whether corporatism without labour can be regarded as a kind of corporatism. Again it is a question of semantics.

## Further Readings

- (1) Literature directly related to Pressure Groups or Pressure Group Activities in Japan.

*Chitoshi Yanaga*, *Big Business in Japanese Politics* (Yale University Press, 1968).

This work provides us with a detailed account on Japanese business organizations. The author explains as follows.

"Most frequently identified with the term *zaikai* are the top executives of four big business organizations ..... *Zaikai*, however, is by no means a

monolithic structure any more than the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party .....”(pp. 32-33)

“It (the Federation of Economic Organizations) is an all-inclusive, powerful organization that functions as the supreme coordinating body of big business. Its main purpose is to maintain close contact with all sectors of the business community for the purpose of adjusting and harmonizing conflicting views and interests of the various businesses and industries represented in its huge membership. .... It is not a pressure group in the usual sense of the term, for its activities are extensive and its influence so great that results are obtained without resorting to ordinary pressure techniques.” (p. 42) “its primary aim is to create a political climate and economic conditions that will insure profits for business and industry through cooperation with the government and within the business community itself.” (p. 44)

His explanation is based on the situation prevailing in the middle of the 1960's. The readers may feel that the political influence exerted by zaikai was overestimated. This feeling would be supportable given the decline of zaikai's power over the past thirty years.

Contents : 1 The Setting, Framework, and Style of Japanese Politics 2 Organized Business : Its Character, Structure, and Functions 3 Organized Business and the Governing Process 4 The Role of the Bureaucracy 5 Political Operations of Organized Business 6 Anti-Monopoly Policy and Government-Business Collaboration (The next five chapters, from 7 to 11, are not primarily about the business organizations.)

*Hiroshi Itoh* (translator and editor), *Japanese Politics - An Inside View : Reading from Japan* (Cornell University Press, 1973).

This work is compiled of nine articles originally written in Japanese by Japanese researchers. All are empirical case studies dealing with the policy-making process, activities of pressure groups, voting behavior and so on.

Selection 3 : Interest Groups in the Legislative Process, written by Naoki

Kobayashi, describes in detail the pressuring tactics used by the Japan Political League of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises to have the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Organization Law legislated. This law was enacted in spite of the opposition, (though not the firm opposition) of the two largest pressure groups, the Federation of Economic Organizations and the General Council of Trade Unions. In that respect, this case study awakens our interest.

*Phylliss A. Genther, A History of Japan's Government-Business Relationship: The Passenger Car Industry (Michigan Papers in Japanese Studies, 1990)*

This volume examines the factors shaping the government-business relationship in the Japanese automobile industry. The author argues as follows: The partnership between them accelerated the creation of policies that protected and supported the industry's development. "These policies allowed companies to experiment with innovative practices that made them competitive and leaders in the world market. .... The creation of a competitive Japanese automobile industry reinstated strong competition in the world market, disturbing existing automobile industries in other countries and creating trade friction." (p. 215)

While interdependence between the U. S. and Japan increases daily, the trade friction between them also increases daily. It is well known that the automobile trade between them has been causing severe friction in recent years.

The following books are informative regarding to the economic reforms carried out by the occupation forces directly after the conclusion of World War II. *T. A. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (University of California Press, 1954), and *R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan* (The Athlone Press Ltd., 1959, 1984). The former is the first detailed study of economic democratization by the allied occupation published in English. The latter is interesting

because of material collected by the author during a stay in small villages in the Japanese countryside.

*Benjamin C. Duke*, *Japan's Militant Teachers: A History of the Left-Wing Teachers' Movement* (The University Press of Hawaii, 1973).

This work is an analysis of the Nikkyōso (the Japan Teachers Union). Nikkyōso is (or was) a mainstream union of the militant left-wing labour movement after the Second World War. (Recently, it has moderated and has become rather economic or friendly society oriented.)

The author argues as follows: "if the prewar and postwar conditions had been not diametrically different; that is, if there had been no nationalistic normal school training, no Great Depression, no postwar poverty, and no conservative reforms of the American occupation reforms, then the militancy of a teachers' union in contemporary Japan would have been significantly moderated ....." (p. 202). As the author mentions in other parts of this book, the painful experience of sending their pupils to battle-fields during the war is another important cause of the union's militancy. Nikkyōso's famous slogan, "Never send our children to the battle-fields again" indicates it persuasively.

He makes the following significant points: Many leaders of the postwar Nikkyōso were graduates from normal schools and nationalists who had enthusiastically cooperated during the conduct of the aggressive war.

"The general sentiment of teachers who had been subservient to the ultranationalistic military regime in the prewar and war years also sparked a militant reaction at the war's end." (p. 196) "Normal schools were highly disciplined, closely regulated, restrictive institutions. Their students received a narrow education and were heavily indoctrinated; they were trained, as it were, to be dogmatists ....." The leaders of Nikkyōso, almost to a man, were trained in this type of environment; these men showed the same rigidity and intolerance with respect to the development of the union,

though in the name of democracy, not of the emperor.” (p. 195)

These citations indicate an origin of the dogmatic inflexibility of the Japanese workers' movement. Nikkyōso's leaders have occupied influential positions as the intellectual leaders of the entire labour movement.

*Donald R. Thurston*, *Teachers and Politics in Japan* (Princeton University press, 1973)

The author describes the history, ideology, and organization of the Japan Teacher's Union. He also describes its demands on the Educational Bureaucracy and its influence on elections, legislations, politics in general, and the union membership.

For a long time the Japan Teachers' Union constituted the largest single organized interest group in the field of education (In the late 1980s, it split into a mainstream, the present Japan Teachers' union and anti-mainstreams). This union is one of the most influential unions among the former General Council of Trade Unions block. It, especially its mainstream, has supported the SDPJ. The author states the following: This union's influence on the national level policy-making is rather weak. Because it is an opposition-aligned interest group and is an outsider. At the prefectural and the lower level, however, this union has exerted a certain influence in the process to implement policies formulated by the Educational Ministry. “As a noisy participant in opposition politics, the J TU (Japan Teachers' Union) has contributed to the strength of the peace movement in Japan, helping to keep alive pacifist sentiment among the people and the desire to retain unamended Article IX of the Constitution, the Famous ‘no war’ article.” (p. 267)

“Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan” written by *Stephen S. Large* (Cambridge University press, 1981) is a very useful study of workers organizations in prewar Japan. The author's primary concern is as follows: “Why did the Japanese labour movement begin the 1920s with

such promise and with so many high expectations of helping to remake Japan in a new democratic image, only to falter and die out in the 1930s?" (p. 233)

*William E. Steslicke*, *Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association* (Praeger Publishers, 1973)

The author analyses the activities of the Japan Medical Association at the beginning of 1960s mainly. His observations lead him to the conclusion that the cabinet, factional leaders of the government party and higher-ranking civil servants are the primary targets or point of access for pressure groups in Japan. "Since the Diet as such is not the arena in which important policy decisions are initiated." (p. 225)

The author accepts as a foundation the pluralistic theory of interest group liberalism and highly evaluates the activities of the Japan Medical Association. He writes as follows: "As an autonomous, voluntary association of doctors, for example, the JMA has served as an intermediary between individual citizens and the state. .... Its activities have also stimulated public interest in medical care and public health issues." (p. 245)

However, the author indicates the elitist character of the JMA's activity. ".... it is clear that the ordinary citizen—the consumer of medical services—participates only indirectly in the policy-making process, and without benefit of unequivocal representation by one of the major organized interest groups. Whether "The doctor knows best philosophy" serves the interests of ordinary citizens .... is open question." (pp. 246-247)

As the author argues, even in the U. S., ".... organized interest groups tend to be the instruments of elites rather than ordinary citizens are propositions that have come to be widely accepted." (p. 246)

*David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa*, *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan* (Harvard University Press, 1984)

This volume examines the radical civil movement stimulated by the

building of the New Tōkyō (Narita) International Airport near 'Sanrizuka'. 'Sanrizuka' is a place name. The mainstream of this movement is farmers and new left radicals. They have been fighting against the government for over two decades.

The author argue that the Sanrizuka movement retrieved a tradition of protests in Japan and added to a history of movements standing against the authority of the state. "Although the Sanrizuka struggle may be coming to an end, then, the phenomenon it represents is, if anything, more widespread." (p. 247)

Violent or radical protest against the state has been scarcely visible in Japan recently. However peaceful and legal protest is rather widespread. The civil movement protesting the introduction of the consumption tax and the Recruit bribery scandal which brought disastrous defeat to the LDP in the 1989 Upper House election is a typical one.

The contents are as follows : 1 Sanrizuka and Shibayama. 2 Hamlets and Households. 3 Past and Present. 4 Field and Fortresses. 5 New Left Sects and their History. 6 The Sects at Sanrizuka. 7 The Christ of the Crossroads. 8 The Hantai Domei. 9 The View from the Top. 10 Reflections on Protest. *Susan J. Pharr*, *Political Women in Japan : The Search for a Place in Political Life* (University of California Press, 1981)

The author analyses women's role in Japanese political life from the lowest levels of participation or voting to the highest levels, such as running for and holding elective offices or gaining key appointive positions in the government or in major political organizations. The author's argument is substantiated by survey research and by comparative study with the role of women in other countries.

Her following conclusion is of great interest. "Women in Japan, like women in all societies today, experience many forms of sex discrimination in their daily lives ..... women feel disappointment, frustration, and anger.

Political participation provides an outlet and target for the release of such feelings. Protest activities in particular hold these attractions.” (pp. 179-180)

The author predicts that women’s participation at all levels will increase. It is still a fresh memory that women’s protest electioneering and voting together with other factors brought about the heavy defeat of the LDP in the 1989 Upper House elections. The writings mentioned below are useful literature on the student movement in Japan.

*Stuart J. Dowsey, ZENKAKUREN : Japan’s Revolutionary Students (The Ishi Press, 1970).*

The Anti-Ampo struggle around 1960 and the University Struggle around 1970 were peaks of militant student movement. From the mid-1970s, not only activities by radicals but of moderates have been declining.

*Henry DeWitt Smith II, Japan’s First Student Radicals (Harvard University Press, 1972).*

This work analyses the prewar student movement focusing on the activities of ‘Shinjinkai’. Shinjikai was an organization composed mainly of student radicals at Tōkyō University who were pursuing democracy.

The following volumes are useful for studying Japanese religion in general and also the relation between ‘Shintō’ and the state.

*Ian Reader, Religion in Contemporary Japan (Macmillan, 1991).*

*Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State 1868-1988 (Princeton University Press, 1991)*

A book examining the supposed peculiarity of Japanese culture is, *Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (Routledge and Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, in paperback 1990).*

(2) Literature on the Political Background of Japan

*Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan (eds.), Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan (Princeton University Press, 1980)*

This literature is composed of the following three parts: Electoral Trends, Citizens' Movements, and Progressive Local Administrations. A total of eight researchers contributed twelve monographs to this volume. Their primary focus is on the developing tendencies of political opposition in Japanese politics in 1970s', specifically on the "Minobe progressive administration in Tokyo prefecture and on the citizens' movement against the pollution of the environment. All articles are substantiated on the basis of empirical research.

*Gary D. Allinson* makes a detailed comparative analysis between two city governments, the progressive administration of "Musashino" city and the conservative administration of "Fuchū" city. Both cities are situated in Tōkyō-To. He analyses electoral results in these two cities from the point of view of demographic, occupational and social group composition. His argument extends to the differences in historical backgrounds between them.

In his conclusion the author writes as follows: "By virtue of their age, their education, and the perspectives on the political process, many Japanese suburbanites are likely supporters of the opposition: whether they actually become opposition supporters will depend in large measure on the organizational efforts of the progressive parties and their candidates". (p. 130)

In actual fact, progressive local governments were for the most part vanishing one by one from the Japanese landscape in the 1980s. However it is certain that the organizational efforts of the progressive camp, especially of the SDPJ, were insufficient.

*Bill Emmott*, *The Sun also Sets: the limits to Japan's economic power* (Simon & Schuster Ltd., 1989).

The author is a talented economic journalist. He stayed in Japan as the chief of the Tōkyō branch of the British journal the "Economist". In those days when this work was published, the Japanese were short-sightedly in

the middle of the so-called 'bubble economy'. Many other commentators from abroad wrote of the limitless possibilities of Japan's economic power.

However the author's fundamental motif was that "the sun named Japan will also set sooner or later". He argues as follows: "Suns do not just rise. They also set. That is the new era in Japan, the era of the setting sun. It was already under way in the mid-1980s, ..... under the influence of the rise itself ; that is, of affluence, international exposure, the capital surplus, and the now-strong yen. Japan is becoming a nation of consumers, of pleasure seekers, of importers, of investors and of speculators. .... More certainly, time and the maturing of the baby-boom generation will make Japan a nation of pensioners." (p. 239)

From the point of view of political science, the following sentences of his are of great significance. "Most important of all, Japan's political power is not an absolute quantity. It can only be gauged relative to that of America, ..... this relationship also defines Japan's political role, whether in defence, multilateral organizations, foreign policy, overseas aid, or international economic cooperation. .... The story of Japan's sunrise and its eventual sunset is really a tale of two countries, of Japan and of America." (p. 256)

*Takeshi Ishida*, Japanese Political Culture (Transaction Publishers, paperback edition 1989)

The contents are as follows. Part One : General Introduction 1. Basic Characteristics of Modern Japan : Value System and Social Structure 2. The Integration of Conformity and Competition Part Two : Japan in Comparative perspective 3. A Current Japanese Interpretation of Max Weber 4. Westernism and Western "Isms" 5. Elements of Transition and "Renovation" in Japan during the "Era of Fascism" Part Three : Essays in Peace Research 6. Beyond the Traditional Concepts of Peace in Different Cultures 7. Japan's Changing Image of Gandhi 8. The Significance of Nonviolent Direct Action : A Japanese Perspective.

His work provides a perceptive background to modern Japanese culture. The author analyses how Japanese society has adapted Western influence to suit its own ends. His arguments present critical views of Japanese culture by a Japanese researcher.

Ishida's "Japanese Society" (Random House, 1971) is of great use in studying Japanese society as perceived by an authoritative Japanese social scientist.

*Jun-ichi Kyōgoku*, *The Political Dynamics of Japan* / translated by Nobutaka Ike (University of Tokyo Press, 1987)

The original notes for this work were made by the author for use as lectures on Japanese politics at Tōkyō University. The Japanese edition ran to about four hundred pages. The English edition is not a direct translation. Some parts were rewritten by the author. Some parts were omitted. The translation is not a line-by-line one. It is a revised and abridged edition.

The author's sophisticated analysis shows deep insight and is very fascinating. However it may not be easy to understand his argument without sufficient knowledge of Japanese politics.

The contents are as follows : 1. Political Structure and Policies 2. Political Paradigms and Processes 3. Politics as Drama 4. Government and Benefits 5. Distributive Politics. 6. Political Criticism 7. Ideological Politics 8. The Power Struggle 9. The Politics of Policy Making.

The author observes Japanese politics in a broad perspective. His reflection from the viewpoint of political culture, particularly from the religious aspect of the Japanese belief system, is profound.

The literature mentioned below should be read as additional classic studies on pressure group politics.

A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (1908). David B. Truman, *Governmental Process* (1951). C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (1956). E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (1960). R. A. Dahl, *Who*

Governs? : Democracy and Power in an American City (1963). *R. A. Dahl*,  
Polyarchy : participation and opposition (1971).